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In her paper “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” (2003), Cora 
Diamond discusses experiences and feelings that defy our regular ways of speaking. 
These are affectively troubling moments where we discover the limits of our 
characteristic taming of experience by our familiar conceptual tools and our rational 
capacity.  
 
As Diamond puts it, these are “experiences in which we take something in reality to 
be resistant to our thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult 
in that way, or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability” (2003, 2-3). 
We are “exposed” (21)2 in our limitations—our concepts do not always provide us the 
grip on reality we think we can and should have. We are exposed in our vulnerability, 
our lack of control of our experience, our being “flesh and blood” (25),3 affective 
creatures that can be overwhelmed by reality.  
 
A central example in Diamond’s paper is our treatment of animals. We share an 
affinity with them that is itself difficult to describe but that we experience when we 
cuddle our companion animals, when we feel the desire to pat animals we meet, when 
we stop for animals crossing the road, when we try to help an injured animal, when 
we enjoy feeding them, feel special when they approach us, when we try to imagine 
what their voices and movements communicate. How can we eat them despite all 
that—animals that were raised in often unspeakable conditions? 
 
The difficulty of reality here is the moment of asking this question, of feeling our 
embodied perturbation and the contradiction it embeds, as we are shocked by this 
practice. This is not to say that everyone experiences this distress, but some of us do, 
and this particularity of the experience is part of what makes it difficult, as it can be a 
lonely experience, exposing us in even greater vulnerability. As Diamond says: “We 
take things so. And the things we take so may simply not, to others, present the kind 
of difficulty—of being hard or impossible or agonizing to get one’s mind round” 
(2003, 3). 
 
The difficulty of philosophy consists in an analogous moment of perturbation of 
philosophical souls, a moment when those of us who have made conceptualizing and 
reasoning into an occupation are left helpless, speechless, exposed, in our inability to 
capture this “how-can-we?” question in a way that would do justice to its affective 
impact.  
 
What philosophers may do in response to their difficulties, says Diamond, is deflect 
from the difficulty, or, as I prefer to call it, inattend to the difficulty. We move away 
from the difficult question, from the embodied feeling of inability to cope with it, by 
 
1 Many thanks to John Hadley, Chris Fleming, Andrew Gleeson, Craig Taylor, Denis 
Schmidt, Paul Alberts, David Macarthur and Noa Salamon for their comments.  
2 A term Diamond borrows from Cavell’s discussion of skepticism of the knowledge 
of others in The Claim of Reason (1979, 433). 
3 This is Another Cavellian term Diamond re-appropriates.  
re-articulating it in terms that are manageable through reasoning. We turn our backs 
to the feeling of horror and focus instead on the matter of its justification.  
 
In what ways are we indeed similar to animals? What rights do animals have or 
should have? What are the relevant objective standards that should decide whether we 
should eat animals at all? Maybe we should only eat certain animals? Shall we hunt 
them or raise them? Are there better and worse ways of killing them? Now we can 
have the illusion that we have mastered the question, and we can move on to answer 
it, and argue for our answer in face of rational objections from our fellow 
philosophers who hold different views. What we have done, effectively, is change the 
topic, inattend to the experience of shock, disgust and disgrace and to the 
philosophical embarrassment of the failure of rationality to capture that experience. 
Diamond acknowledges that reason need not be an instrument of inattention and may 
even contribute to facing the problem (for example, 2003, 22-23, footnote 22), but her 
paper is largely devoted to showing the limits of reason in comprehending difficult 
realities.  
 
In order to discuss the difficulty philosophy has engaging with this particular 
difficulty of reality to do with our treatment of animals, Diamond turns to J.M. 
Coetzee’s fictional character Elizabeth Costello in his novel The Lives of Animals 
(1999), originally delivered as the 1997 Tanner Lectures on Human Value at 
Princeton University. In this work Costello delivers two university lectures on the 
animals’ topic and partakes in a debate. The fictional lectures were 
later republished as chapters of another Coetzee novel Elizabeth Costello, 2003. 
 
Costello presents herself as “wounded” by our treatment of animals, and her 
confrontation with that difficulty of reality is “haunted,” as Diamond says, by the 
imagery of the Holocaust (2003, 3). Costello’s woundedness and hauntedness are 
further aggravated due to her isolation in that experience, and the criticism her 
feelings face, since—as Diamond explains—“thinking this horror [of our treatment of 
animals] with the imagery of the Holocaust is or can be felt to be profoundly 
offensive” (2003, 3). Diamond does not say much about this emotional reception of 
Costello’s use of the Holocaust, and focuses on the philosophical reception of Peter 
Singer and Amy Gutmann in the Tanner lectures. She claims that they have 
misunderstood Costello, taking her in general to be making arguments for 
vegetarianism or animal rights, and in particular to be using imagery of the Holocaust 
for those argumentative purposes.  
 
In this chapter, I first examine these emotional and philosophical responses to 
Costello. I argue that they both come from the interpretation of the text as making a 
comparison between the Holocaust and our treatment of animals. But if Diamond is 
correct, and Costello is not arguing or moralizing, then she is not making a 
comparison. I then proceed to suggest that Costello is, or at least could be, engaged in 
describing an affectively charged seeing-as experience, a seeing-as experience that is 
imagistic and non-conceptual. I conclude by identifying a different task for 
philosophy, additional to the dominant tradition of argumentation whose importance 
Diamond never denies. This is the task of articulation of one’s experience, a task that 
Diamond effectively and successfully engages in in her paper.   
 
Although this chapter deals with issues of moral significance, I do not judge whether 
or not the comparison in question is morally wrong, and I do not intend to engage in 
any comparison between animals and people or suggest any moral conclusion or 
imperative regarding how we should treat them. My discussion belongs to the realm 
of philosophical psychology, exploring the affective phenomenon of the difficulties 
Diamond brings to attention. If any ethical message comes through from my 
reflections, then it is an implicit call for moral modesty, for the appreciation of our 
capacity to inattend to our moral failings, a capacity that may manifest itself precisely 
when we generate general moral imperatives to be used in the moral judgment of 
others.  
 
The comparison between the Holocaust and our treatment of animals 
 
Let us first examine why people, in particular Jewish people, may be offended by the 
comparison between the Holocaust and our treatment of animals. I use the modal term 
“may” to signify an empirical contingency. Whether the comparison is objectively 
offensive, whatever “objectively” might mean here, is not my concern. I am rather 
interested in the causes for the actual emotional response to this comparison, not in 
whether the emotional response is justified. The fictional character, Prof. Stern, 
explains his offence as follows:  
 
You took over for your own purposes the familiar comparison between the 
murdered Jews of Europe and slaughtered cattle. The Jews died like cattle, 
therefore cattle die like Jews, you say. That is a trick with words which I will 
not accept. You misunderstood the nature of likenesses; I would even say you 
misunderstand willfully, to the point of blasphemy. Man is made in the 
likeness of God but God does not have the likeness of man. If Jews were 
treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are treated like Jews. The 
inversion insults the memory of the dead. It also trades on the horrors of the 
camps in a cheap way (Coetzee 1999, 49-50). 
 
Stern reminds Costello that when people make a comparison in order to make a point, 
they are using it in order to highlight certain respects in which the comparison holds. 
They are using it intentionally, representationally, in order to convey meaning—A 
represents B in respects X, Y, and Z. Rhetorically, comparisons are used as a 
unidirectional relation: the similarity between A and B is telling us something about 
B; the difference or opposition between A and B is telling something about what B is 
not.  
 
The comparison, as it has been traditionally voiced by Jewish people, is meant to 
convey something about the victims of the Holocaust, namely, that they were treated 
like animals, and that they are not similar to animals. This is what is meant to be 
horrifying in the comparison so voiced—that people were treated in a way that de-
humanizes them. The comparison, as originally voiced, is not meant to tell us 
something about animals, say that animals are victims like the human victims of the 
Holocaust. But Costello, so it seems to Stern, is using the comparison in this 
bidirectional way, which is a “trick,” since comparisons are not supposed to be used 
that way. Although the trick might be meant to mobilize Costello’s audience to her 
vegetarian agenda, it effectively amounts to the claim that the Jews who died in the 
Holocaust were indeed similar to cattle—precisely the offense that the original phrase 
was meant to deny.  
 
Once more I want to clarify that I am not interested in moralizing about the 
comparison as voiced by Costello (or Heidegger (1949))4 or animal rights activists 
(e.g. (Patterson 2002)), nor Stern’s emotional reaction to it. My goal is to try and 
understand what can cause an insult here. It is hard for me to understand Stern, since I 
know so little about him (I am just guessing he is Jewish because of his name), so I 
shall try and understand myself, and why I felt offended by this comparison—and this 
is a causal “why” rather than a rational one. I do not claim to be right or wrong in my 
offense or to speak for others through the voice of reason. I speak for myself alone, 
and possibly for others who may identify with the description of my emotional 
experience.   
 
When I try and think why the comparison between the Holocaust and our treatment of 
animals has offended me, I am not denying its truth—that the animals we raise live a 
short life of misery, without possibilities to flourish, and are then “transported” in 
despicable conditions into death factories hidden from plain sight, a description that 
also fits the way Jewish people were treated in the Holocaust. Nor am I denying the 
moral claim that animals should not be treated in this way.  
 
What makes me feel bad, that is, when this makes me feel bad, since it is not a 
reliable emotional pattern for me, is the comparison of one horror—the one I feel 
close to, that touched my family and the families of the people I grew up with—with 
another, different horror. The very question “what is morally worse?” hurts me, not 
the second question, “which victim has the greater moral value?”, that is only asked 
by those who accept that first question. And I often feel a very similar offense 
whenever the Holocaust is compared to another genocide. This is not because I feel 
that Jewish victimhood is somehow more special than that of other nations or that the 
horrors of the Holocaust are worse than any other horror. It is because my experience 
and my people’s experience is unique, singular, and I feel that this singularity is 
ignored when the Holocaust is treated like a competitor in some general genocide 
contest of misery and dreadfulness.   
 
I do not know anything about and I won’t argue against the academic comparative 
research of genocide, which presumably studies various historical events at a coarse-
grained level of description, identifying trends and patterns in this dark aspect of 
human history. I also do not want to deny that there may be occasions when people 
experience affective empathy, something like a group emotion, where the group may 
include people from different nations, touched by different historical events.  
 
Yet, there is a perspective from which every historical event is singular, with its own 
distinctive causes, and its own detailed description.5 Indeed, any traumatic event of a 
specific person, whether it is the experience of a Holocaust survivor, or of survivors 
of rape, child abuse, or assault, is a singular event. And so is the affective experience 
 
4 Heidegger’s comparative comment, originally spoken at a lecture, has a history of 
deletion and publication (Gordon 2014). 
5  See Windelband’s distinction between the nomothetic and idiographic sciences 
(1894).  
of the trauma itself, whether it is a group trauma or one’s own personal trauma: it is 
singular, irreproducible, incomparable. 
 
It is incomparable precisely since, in its specificity of horrendous details, trauma 
belongs to the difficult realm of reality Diamond talks about. Part of the traumatic 
experience itself is the difficulty of representing it—when it occurs and thereafter 
(Lyotard 1988). The resistance of trauma to conceptualization, which is inherent to 
the experience, is ignored and left unacknowledged when it is rated on some 
conceptualized scale of horrors. This flattening of one’s experience by someone else, 
treating it as mere data, as if it is so easily capturable, manageable, digestible, 
constitutes a profound lack of acknowledgement, as if precisely what is traumatic 
about the experience, its painful escape from conceptual grip, never really occurred. 
This can be experienced as a terrible aggression. 
 
Importantly, the distinction between the singularity of experience and the generality 
of comparison, where the latter comes at the expense of the former, is not merely a 
psychological matter of a potential offence. The singularity of the Holocaust as well 
as the singularity of the ongoing slaughter of animals, are parts of the difficulty of 
reality that are left as an unacknowledged remainder when we regard Costello’s use of 
the Holocaust as a moral-philosophical argument. This argument from analogy goes 
more or less as follows:  
 
1) The Holocaust and our treatment of animals involve similar practices. 
2) People and animals are similar. 
3) The Holocaust is a moral wrong. 
Conclusion—our treatment of animals is just as morally wrong and should be 
stopped.6   
 
In fact, Coetzee himself worded this argument as follows:  
 
We cried: What a terrible crime, to treat human beings like cattle. If only we 
had known beforehand! But our cry should more accurately have been: What a 
terrible crime to treat human beings like units in an industrial process! And 
that cry should have had a postscript: What a terrible crime, come to think of 
it, to treat any living being like a unit in an industrial process! (Coetzee 2007) 
 
The crux of the argument consists in the comparison of people and animals, which is 
the interest of moral philosophers who discuss the treatment of animals. Singer claims 
that the argument fails at premise (2), because humans and animals are not of the 
same moral value, and so killing them differs in moral significance (1999, 87-90). 
Now that we are busy trying to compare people and animals, the Holocaust as well as 
the treatment of animals are left out of focus, as some kind of a background 
motivation for the discussion.  
 
 
6 I suppose that this is more or less what Gutmann means when she regards the 
comparison as an argument from analogy. And I also suppose that this is more or less 
what Singer ascribes to Costello, since he is focused on the comparative moral value 
of killing people vs. animals, which in turn rests on the comparison between people 
and animals more generally.  
I suggest that an important aspect of inattention to the difficulty of reality and of 
philosophy consists in the generalizing move that leaves out the singularity of the 
difficult affectively perturbing moments to which Diamond is calling attention. Those 
who are in that moment, feeling the difficulty of their reality, may feel offended when 
their difficulty is disregarded and their affect is left behind in favor of a cold 
argument.  
 
Diamond finds the reading of Costello as presenting arguments crude and mistaken. 
Indeed, Costello says she does not want to partake in philosophical discourse. As John 
Hadley notes, Costello here is strikingly different from Coetzee, who has much faith 
in “the faculty of abstract thought” (Coetzee 2007, quoted in Hadley 2009, 214).7 
Hadley takes Costello to be making the comparison for its shock value, similarly to 
other animal rights activists who defend coercive and nondeliberative forms of 
activism such as humor, rhetoric, gossip, and graphic imagery.8 He reads Costello as 
“skeptical” that “armchair reflection” can move people to change their behavior 
towards animals (2009, 214). But according to Diamond, Costello is skeptical of 
armchair reflection tout court; she is skeptical of rational argument.   
 
There is evidence for that interpretation in the text. As Cary Wolfe notes, Costello “is 
quick to point to the inconsistency of her own practices with regard to animal 
products” (2008, 5) Whatever her affective experience away from the armchair is, it is 
not intertwined with some deep understanding or reason, or she would feel the same 
disgust while wearing leather shoes. And it is also worthwhile mentioning the literary 
device whereby we are told and shown how Costello does not get along with her 
daughter in law, Norma, a PhD in philosophy. Finally, one of the main themes of the 
novel Elizabeth Costello is precisely Costello’s refusal to partake in the discourse of 
rational commitments.9  
 
Diamond takes Costello at her word, as presenting “a rawness of nerves” (2003, 4). 
Costello turns to the imagery of the Holocaust as a way of dealing with her difficulty 
to conceptualize and argue about the difficulty of the reality of what we do to animals. 
And that difficulty, for Diamond, as it is for John McDowell, is not just the difficulty 
to rationally explain the difficulty of reality; It is also the difficulty to speak about it at 
all. Something about the experience resists its articulation in words (Diamond 2003, 
2, 17; McDowell 2008, 134, 136-137).10  
 
But ultimately, Diamond thinks that this attempt to turn to imagery instead of 
argument is compromised:  
 
[Costello’s] understanding of our relation to animals seems to throw into 
shadow the full horror of what we do to each other, as if we could not keep in 
focus the Holocaust as an image for what we do to animals without losing out 
 
7 (Coetzee also has faith in the “tender hearts” of children (2007).  
8 And also threats and property damage. For details about this debate, see Hadley 
(2015).   
9 For a demonstration of that theme throughout the novel see Jenkins 2013, which also 
argues that this is the stance of the novelist rather than the philosopher.  
10 Cavell, too, speaks of “disappointment with meaning, or say with language” in his 
response to Diamond’s paper (2008, 101). 
ability to see it, and to see what it fully shows us of ourselves. So there is a 
part of the difficulty of reality here that is not seen by Costello: so far as we 
keep one sort of difficulty in view we seem blocked from seeing another 
(2003, 10). 
 
Diamond’s reading of Costello has textual support. If this is correct, then it seems that 
Costello is not actually making a comparison, even if she says that this is what she is 
doing (Coetzee 1999, 20, 21), since a comparison is an argumentative move, which 
equalizes the compared and generates generalities. It would be, so it seems to me, far 
more interesting to think of Costello as doing something other than making that 
familiar comparison for the sake of a vegetarian agenda, even if there is perhaps also 
textual support for this latter interpretation. The lectures, of which the much-discussed 
comparison is actually a small part, contain fragments of arguments, as Diamond calls 
them. Diamond incorporates those fragments into her reading, noting how Costello is 
able to use them to emphasize her “very different mode of approach” (2003, 8), not 
following the norms of philosophical argumentation.  
 
In what follows, I try to clarify what it is Costello may be engaged in if it is not a 
comparison. I shall suggest it is a similar phenomenon to seeing two people within 
one character in our dreams, or being vividly reminded of someone while looking at 
someone else. I hope to explain why indeed Diamond is correct to say that much 
about the Holocaust might be left out of view in such an experience, even if it is, 
actually, recoverable. The offense is, perhaps, avoidable on this reading. And I shall 
further suggest that even on such a reading, Costello is nonetheless engaged in the 
verbalization of this difficulty of reality.  
 
Comparisons vs. Imagistic Seeing-As 
 
In the rest of this chapter, I want to suggest that Costello is describing to us an 
affectively charged “seeing-as” experience, where we see our treatment of animals in 
terms of the Holocaust. And by “seeing-as” I am referring to a particular kind of 
experience that Wittgenstein discusses in the Investigations (1953, II-XI). Perhaps the 
most well-known example is of the duck-rabbit drawing that can be seen either as 
rabbit or as a duck. Another example, which I shall focus on here, is the following:  
 
I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it 
has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience “noticing an 
aspect”. (1953, II-XI, §113) 
 
Seeing-as experiences are those where we can see the very same object in different 
ways; the way the object looks changes. When it comes to the duck-rabbit example 
many of us can switch perspectives and alternate what we see or what the drawing 
looks like. Yet with the faces example, when similarity strikes us, we see the second 
face within the first face, as it were. We do not lose the first face when we also see the 
second within it, even if we are now attending to an aspect of it and thereby not to 
others, whereas we lose the duck we initially saw when we switch perspective and see 
the rabbit.  
 
It may seem tasteless to be thinking about similar faces just after the above discussion 
about delicate and serious matters such as the Holocaust and factory farming. But I 
shall try to show that this simple matter has serious implications for these much more 
complex issues. In this section I propose an account of the seeing-as experience for 
which the similar faces example is the paradigm, and in the next section, I shall try to 
show that possibly, this is what Costello is experiencing when it comes to the 
Holocaust and factory farming.  
 
Wittgenstein scholars almost ubiquitously interpret seeing-as experiences as 
conceptually embedded. I can see the same image differently, since, so the claim 
goes, each visual experience is filtered through a different concept. Call this the 
conceptualist assumption.  
 
Here are just two articulations of this assumption. Severin Schroeder says: “Aspect 
perception is concept-laden. Seeing something as an X presupposes mastery of the 
concept of an X” (2010, 357). And Stephen Mulhall says: “Even in pictorial contexts, 
the relevant words become an essential part of the expression of one’s visual 
experience rather than of a perceptual report” (2001, 167). 
 
According to the conceptualist, then, when it suddenly strikes me that the daughter is 
similar to her mother, when I see aspects of the mother’s face in the daughter’s face, I 
am seeing the daughter’s face in terms of the demonstrative concept “the mother”, 
which in turn refers to the mother or to an image of the mother.  
 
But why must this be the case? Why must this visual experience require conceptual 
mediation? It seems equally plausible that I see the image of the daughter in terms of 
the image of the mother, and that no concepts need be involved in the experience. For 
this visual experience to presuppose concepts, one would have to hold a theory of 
perception such as McDowell’s, which claims that perception itself is conceptual 
through and through (2004), that without concepts of any sort one cannot carve out in 
perception any object or point to it.   
 
I will not argue here against McDowell, nor for the understanding of perception I 
favor. I just want to note that at the very least this is a topic for debate and that it is 
possible that perception is not a capacity that involves concepts or even the activity of 
representing. Such is the view of Charles Travis (2013), who criticizes in detail the 
conceptualist assumption about (different) seeing-as experiences along these lines 
(2016).  
 
The conceptualist assumption is an attempt to solve a riddle, to explain a strange 
experience where I see something and then see it differently. I would like to suggest 
that this “seeing differently” experience amounts to associating one image with 
another image. Whereas Schroeder says that a seeing-as involves noticing a similarity 
(2010, 355), I suggest that all that the seeing-as experience in the faces example 
amounts to is a noticing of a similarity.   
 
In all likelihood, when I see the daughter in terms of the mother, it is also the case that 
I apply the demonstrative concept “the mother”, and I could then say “the daughter is 
similar to the mother”. But this would not be an expression of my seeing the drawing 
as a mother, as if I am reading out the words that are part and parcel of the perceptual 
experience itself. It would be a report, a description of my experience rather than an 
integral part of it.  
 
Similarities that we see and notice, similarities that are salient to us, among objects 
that are salient to us, lend themselves to meaning-giving, and we will use concepts, 
which are in turn in the space of reasons, to describe them. I focus here on 
similarities, but there are other associations, for example inversions, such as the 
association between black and white. Inversions can also partake in a seeing-as 
experience. I will speak about inversions in the next section, but first, let us note a few 
features of such an imagistic seeing-as experience, focusing on similarity 
associations: 
 
1) It is a bi-directional relation: when I see the daughter’s face in terms of the 
mother’s face, I also see the mother’s face in terms of the daughter’s face. The aspect 
I notice belongs to both, and I experience it as belonging to both, at the same time. I 
see what Freud calls a “condensation” (e.g. 1900), the paradigm of which is the 
experience of a dream character that looks like and feels like two (or more) people at 
the same time. A condensation does not make us lose, as it were, either of the faces. 
But it makes us focus on a certain aspect of each of them, the mother-like aspects in 
the daughter, and the daughter-like aspects in the mother.  
 
2) Its bi-directionality excludes it from being representational and semantic. Let us 
examine similarities that are used representationally and semantically to see the 
difference: a metaphor, such as “Juliet is the Sun”, is a similarity that is used to 
convey some meaning about Juliet—that she is luminous, radiant, energizing, life-
affirming, that she can burn Romeo if he gets too close, and so on. The metaphor is 
not used to talk about the Sun. Juliet represents the Sun; the Sun does not represent 
Juliet. A condensation, on the other hand, is not about any of the two (or more) 
images that partake in it but rather highlights aspects of both (or all) of them at once. 
The condensation itself is a meaningless visual experience. When we use concepts to 
describe a condensation, we are describing our passive experience rather than actively 
using one image to say something new and meaningful about the other. We give 
meaning to the experience as a whole, listing the respects in which a similarity 
between two faces holds, thereby describing both faces at the same time. Admittedly, 
though, each face would be then described only partially, due to this limited focus. 
Nonetheless, similarity associations and metaphors are strongly related. Romeo 
may as well be looking at the Sun, experience its heat, feel its rays flickering through 
clouds, as if dancing, feel the burning sensation both inhibiting him from, and 
attracting him to, look right at it, and be passively reminded of Juliet and how he feels 
for her; or he may be looking at Juliet, feeling both the pull of the desire and the push 
of fear to touch her, feeling the warmth in his body in wave of love and desire, and be 
passively reminded of the Sun. Romeo’s experience can then inspire him to speak 
poetically about Juliet. It is the intentional usage of a similarity association that turns 
it into a semantic and unidirectional metaphor. Associations are what grounds poetic 
means of expression (Sperber & Wilson 1986, 155). And this is the case not just for 
similarities and metaphors, but also for inversions and binary oppositions (for 
example, Laurel and Hardy) or for part-whole relations and metonyms.  
 
3) Unreliability: Not everyone must share this experience. I could see a similarity that 
you don’t. I cannot assume that everyone will see the similarities that I see. Even if I 
point out to you the various respects in which the faces are similar, you may fail to 
see the similarity I see. However, I do assume that someone, somewhere, sometime, 
can see the similarity I see, or I will suspect that I am insane.  
 
The experience of seeing a similarity between two specific things, then, does not 
reliably occur in all subjects when these two things are present or remembered. In 
fact, even the same person need not see the same similarity on every relevant 
occasion. I used to see a similarity between my mother and my sister, and I don’t see 
it any more, even if I remember I did see it in the past, even if others can see it, and 
even if I may see it again in the future.  
 
Although unreliability is a causal notion, the non-universality and relative instability 
of the phenomenon further show that it is a non-conceptual and thereby non-rational 
phenomenon.11 When it comes to concept application, we expect universal agreement 
about its correctness or incorrectness, and we regard that agreement as not occasion-
sensitive. In fact, even if you cannot see the subjective similarity I see, even if you 
cannot share this experience, “similarity” qua concept either applies or does not apply 
to the two faces. Presumably, a computer recognition program can settle our 
differences, objectively comparing colors and geometrical shapes to one another, 
applying some predetermined standard of similarity.  
 
4) Imagistic seeing-as relations often cause what Freud calls “transference” of affect 
(e.g. 1900): If I meet someone new and notice a similarity between that new person 
and someone I love, I am likely to have good feelings about that new person.  
 
5) Even when we share the experience, it remains singular: Associations, even if we 
can examine them in isolation—this image is associated with that image—are not 
atomistic states of mind. When I associate the daughter’s face with the mother’s face, 
my associative capacity does not stop there. The mother’s face—say, my colleague—
is likely to be further associated with an experience I had with that mother, and/or 
with a dream or a fantasy I had about her, and/or with the office where she works, 
and/or with various other people or things or situations that the mother reminds me of. 
Even if I never met the two faces in my condensation experience, they are likely to 
remind me of various other people or things or situations. And those memories or 
fantasies, which now partake in this condensation, may in turn be affectively 
characterized, an affect that can be “enlivened” through association, to speak like 
Hume (1738), thereby characterizing the seeing-as experience. You and I both could 
be struck by the similarity between the daughter and the mother, and some of our 
associations may be the same ones (in particular the one between the daughter’s face 
and the mother’s face). But for each of us, the experience is likely to also activate or 
create idiosyncratic associations that we do not share. These idiosyncratic associations 
may not be the same on every occasion, and so I may experience different affects on 
different occasions, or sometimes see the similarity with no conspicuous affect at all.  
 
This idea of a potentially affective train of association might sound entirely 
speculative, because most people are only aware of the two faces in the experienced 
condensation. But one could easily experience this ongoing associative movement of 
the mind—just try to think of nothing and see for yourself why people have to hum or 
 
11 That is, if we take concepts to be in the space of reasons, as explained in the next 
section. 
repeat a mantra or focus on their bodily sensations in order to try and block 
associations in meditation. When it comes to our faces example, I am unlikely to 
notice these associations as they “pop” into mind, since I am focused on the faces. Yet 
I could potentially be particularly attentive and notice them, as fleeting as they may 
be. Associations are unconscious in the sense of our habitual inattention to them.12 
 
It is important to distinguish this experience of salient similarity, which strikes us, 
comes over us, affects us uninvited, from comparisons, which are active, engaging, 
and can be applied to any two or more things, as randomly as we wish (since anything 
is similar to anything in countless respects, as philosophers often say). I can be asked 
to compare two faces, and start examining whether various features such as the noses, 
the lips, or the facial expressions, are similar. A comparison is a judgment, a form of 
argument. It demands agreement from anyone who shares our perceptual and 
conceptual capacities. And it can be true or false. If I describe, on the other hand, the 
salient similarity between the faces as it strikes me—I am not actively making a 
comparison, I am not passing judgment, and what I am saying is not truth evaluative. 
I am just describing my experience. At most, I am inviting another person to have that 
experience too, but I cannot assume that this person will share the experience.  
 
Seeing the Holocaust in terms of factory farming 
 
I want to present a reading of Costello as being struck by the similarity between the 
Holocaust and our treatment of animals, seeing them in terms of one another. But I 
am not doing this as a literary critic, and I am not too concerned with being correct 
about this reading. What is important for my purposes is to show that such an 
experience is possible, even if I do not share it myself.  
 
But how could such two complex and multi-faceted events (one of which is ongoing) 
be illuminated by the simple experience of seeing one face in terms of another face? It 
might seem that the involvement of concepts here is inevitable. So first I want to 
make the conceptual point that even the most abstract and complex notions have, or at 
least can have, an experiential, non-conceptual aspect. And second, I want to note that 
these two particular concepts, the demonstrative concept or proper name “The 
Holocaust” and “our treatment of animals”, lend themselves particularly well to an 
imagistic association, which Costello’s words describe. 
 
Begin with the more general point then. Insofar as words are concepts, as Frege says, 
they receive their meaning within a proposition, the conceptual counterpart of a 
sentence (1884, x). And propositions in turn partake in reasoning, and so concepts, as 
Brandom emphasizes, are nodes in an inferential network of beliefs (2000).13 When 
Frege articulates his notion of concept he is careful to clear the meaning of concepts 
from all private associations: various images, from memory or fantasy, some of which 
may be idiosyncratic to one person and others shared among people from a certain 
 
12 I have elsewhere suggested that the Freudian unconscious is nothing other but this 
associative capacity (Morag 2016).  
13 There are other notions of concept available in the philosophical and psychological 
literature (Margolis and Laurence 2011). But given Diamond’s philosophical heritage, 
as well as that of the other philosophers discussed in her paper, this is the only notion 
of concept that is relevant here.  
social niche. This purification of the concept from the word shows precisely that 
words have another, non-conceptual aspect. Words are also marks and noises with a 
host of associations in their wake. These associations include not only images but also 
sounds, smells, feelings, or any other sense modality.  
 
Some of these associations could qualify as instances of the general conceptual items 
in question, and others need not be. The word “mother” can be associated to an image 
of my mother, or an image of a stereotypical mother from a TV commercial, but it can 
also be associated with my male neighbor, that somehow reminds me of my mother, 
say because of the way he talks to his dog or a certain mannerism they share. For this 
and other reasons, which go beyond the scope of this paper, I characterize these 
associations as “imaginative,” as Hume did (1738).   
 
Entire sentences too are on the one hand propositions and on the other hand marks 
and noises, with a host of associations in their wake, such as the scenes they may be 
describing and/or the occasions on which we heard them. And those scenarios are, in 
turn, imagistic, and may also be affectively charged. And these scenarios, or certain 
parts of them, may further be associated with other imagistic scenarios.  
 
The Holocaust, as difficult as it may be to conceptualize and represent, has actually 
been discussed conceptually in many books and articles. But it is also associated with 
many images, from photographs and movies, fiction and documentary. Survivors have 
described particular experiences, and those who listened to them plausibly have 
fantasies that these descriptions imprinted in them. Some specific images include the 
trains to the death camps, the line of people about to enter the gas chambers, the 
smoke coming out of the gas chambers, piles of corpses, documentaries of ladies 
selecting soaps made of humans, medical experiments. These are all images, and they 
can haunt one’s dreams and visually penetrate one’s waking life, even if one has not 
experienced the Holocaust first-hand.  
 
The images I selected here can be seen as similar to images that are in the wake of the 
complex notion “our treatment of animals”. One could see the soap we produce from 
animals in terms of the soap the Nazis produced from people, or rather in terms of 
those soaps one saw in a German documentary. One could see the factory farms in 
terms of the death camps or more specifically the gas chambers—the way they look. 
The images that are so strongly associated with each of them can strike one as similar.  
 
Here is how Costello describes her experience. She says to her son, in a state of 
agitation: 
 
I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly 
normal relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are 
participants in a crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I 
must be mad! Yet every day I see the evidences. The very people I suspect 
produce the evidence, exhibit it, offer it to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses 
that they have bought for money. ‘It is as if I were to visit friends, and to make 
some polite remark about the lamp in their living room, and they were to say, 
“Yes, it’s nice, isn’t it? Polish-Jewish skin it’s made of, we find that’s best, the 
skins of young Polish-Jewish virgins.” And then I go to the bathroom and the 
soap wrapper says, “Treblinka—100% human stearate.” Am I dreaming, I say 
to myself? What kind of house is this? Yet I’m not dreaming. I look into your 
eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s and see only kindness, human kindness. 
Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. This is 
life. Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t you?’ (Coetzee 1999, 69) 
 
This passage can be interpreted as a description of an imagistic seeing-as experience, 
seeing specific images relating to our treatment of animals in terms of specific images 
relating to the Holocaust. This similarity is very much alive to Costello, bringing her 
to tears. Both imageries are present for her at the same time, affectively amplifying 
one another, overwhelming her with her shock and horror—how people treat animals, 
how they treat one another, and how they can do that without facing their actions. 
This is why Stern is in a sense correct: she is describing a bidirectional relation, 
unpacking a condensation.  
 
Costello’s imagistic seeing-as experience, her affectively charged condensation, also 
involves imaginative associations that are not similarities, but inversions. The most 
vivid one in this passage is the opposition between seeing kindness in people’s eyes, 
and seeing them doing something that she finds so disgusting: effectively supporting 
great cruelty. This cruelty is not merely an abstract concept for her but an imagery she 
connects to a host of horrifying Holocaust images. That inversion is an imaginative 
association, an opposition between the look in her loved-ones eyes and the deed they 
perform, between the love she feels for her family and the shock of witnessing their 
partaking in practices that put chills down her spine. It is something Costello 
experiences as part of the imagistic seeing-as experience that condenses the imagery 
of the Holocaust with the imagery of our treatment of animals.  
 
Inversions differ from logical contradictions. Logical contradictions cannot allow 
experiencing two contradictory things or events (X and not-X). An inversion between 
two positive things or properties or events (X and Y), which oppose one another in 
certain respects, is a psychological capacity whereby we can imagine two opposing 
things at once. Inversions too are seeing-as experiences. Costello sees the kindness in 
her loved-ones’ eyes, and then she sees it differently, seeing it not on its own but as 
opposed to the cruelty the loved-ones ignore. She knows the loved-ones have not 
changed, that their eyes are staring at her just as they did a moment ago, and yet now 
they—the loved-ones, their eyes—shock her, both kind and blind at the same time, as 
if staring right at the terrible images without seeing them. 
 
These are also the eyes that look at her, at Costello, as being a bit mad. She is dealing 
with the difficulty of reality that Diamond talks about, the one to do with eating 
animals at all, their “corpses. Fragments of corpses”. It is not like that difficulty 
would go away if those animals had a good life and died in their sleep in old age, to 
paraphrase McDowell (2008, 130-131). But this difficulty is “amplified”, as 
McDowell says (2008, 131), by the horrors that come on top of that, to the point that 
Costello becomes “unhinged” when she presents her seeing-as experience as a 
comparison (2008, 134).14 I also see Costello as spiraling into this imagistic seeing-as 
experience. And I think that a major causal factor in this amplification consists in the 
uncomprehending responses she keeps receiving from her family and her colleagues 
 
14  Diamond says regarding a different example of the difficulty of reality: “The 
attempt to think it is to feel one’s thinking come unhinged” (2003, 12). 
regarding her original difficulty, the one Diamond shares, about eating animals. It is 
her way of screaming, to speak like Cavell (2008, 113), because she is not heard, 
despite her ongoing efforts to describe her feelings.   
 
Through these amplifications, this imagistic seeing-as experience that initial difficulty 
proliferates into further difficulties: the difficulty of comprehending how people can 
be so nice and cooperate with this horror at the same time; the difficulty to 
comprehend the blindness of those horrified by the Holocaust to the horror done to 
animals; and the difficulty to see all that and still have normal relations and even love 
relationships with most people.  
 
Although I do not have the space to demonstrate this in detail, I nevertheless suggest 
that what Diamond calls “the difficulty of reality”, at least in the examples she gives 
in that paper, comes down to an imaginative association of inversion that comprises 
or partly comprises an imagistic seeing-as relation. Some of Diamond’s examples for 
the difficulty of reality involve inversions in the respect of life/death: imagining one’s 
own death; the experience portrayed in Ted Hughes’s poem, of seeing a photograph 
of lively young soldiers while knowing that within six month of that photographed 
moment they all died in the war. These are seeing-as experiences: we see something 
dead as alive and vise versa. As Costello says when describing the experience of 
trying to imagine our own death: “For an instant, before my whole structure of 
knowledge collapses in panic, I am alive inside that contradiction, dead and alive at 
the same time” (Coetzee 1999, 32). Traumatic experiences in general also involve a 
sense of impossibility, the impossibility being and of having been treated in this way 
by another person, of walking around in a seemingly complete body while feeling 
shattered and scattered. 
 
The associative imagination knows no negation or contradiction, to paraphrase 
Freud’s words on the unconscious (1915, 186-187). The two opposing images are 
both positive (whereas there is no image for “not” or mere negation), and they can be 
experienced at once, focusing on and amplifying certain aspects of both images, 
images that have not changed, but that now seem different. From a logical point of 
view they may seem either trivial—“The men were alive, and now are dead; what’s 
the problem?” (Diamond 2003, 14) —or nonsensical: “dead and alive at the same 
time? What does that actually mean, if by meaning we refer to the inferential role of 
words qua concepts?” Yet if we go through this affective experience, the rational 
perspective is failing to capture something we do experience, a failure that renders the 
experience inexplicable in Diamond’s sense. From the point of view of habitual 
experience, inversions feel impossible. And so these feelings of inexplicability and 
impossibility characterize the difficulty of reality.  
 
Like salient similarity associations, inversions too strike us unbidden and need not be 
experienced by everyone. Nor must they be experienced in the same affective way 
when they are experienced. The inversion that partakes in Costello’s seeing-as 
experience makes her cry in despair. But a very similar inversion could perhaps make 
someone else laugh. One could imagine finding dark humor in the scene of the serious 
and tortured Costello having dinner with her more or less entertained and 
intellectually interested colleagues, some of whom are eating fish that may be staring 
at everyone from their plates, just after a lecture where the guest of honor is 
presenting herself as a wounded animal, making this loaded “comparison”. Inversions 
are so commonly used in jokes, that some say “incongruity” is what laughter tracks in 
the social environment (D’Arms and Jacobson 2003, 139). An inversion could also 
cause embarrassment and worry, as it does for Costello’s son over that dinner, when 
the joke or irony is on oneself or on someone we love, and we are all too aware of the 
volatility of a situation where our loved-one’s torture is not registered by the social 
setting.  
 
Costello is asking herself if she is mad or dreaming because she has not succeeded, at 
least not so far, to share her imagistic seeing-as experience and the difficulties of 
reality it involves. This potential loneliness that lurks in every experience of the 
difficulty of reality comes from, I suggest, its imaginative-associative nature. 
Imaginative associations are singular, and one is never assured company in the 
experience, even if one needs and craves that company. Here, again, I prefer 
Diamond’s reading that does not see Costello as moralizing. It makes no sense to 
moralize someone into seeing something—one either sees it or does not see it; there is 
no question of whether one “should” see it. I say “prefer” because one can feel 
moralized at when reading Costello’s lectures. I prefer to see Costello as inviting 
people to share in her experience out of need for company, for acknowledgment of 
her feelings. An interpretation that sees Costello as moralizing coheres with an 
interpretation of her making a comparison that has moral implications, and I suppose I 
prefer to be neither moralized at nor offended.  
 
Seeing the common imagistic aspects of the Holocaust and of our treatment of 
animals together is a matter of a certain focus. It means that the dissimilar aspects are 
left out of focus, and together with them the distinctiveness of the Holocaust, which is 
dear to those touched by it. In that sense Diamond is correct. We cannot keep in focus 
the full significance of the Holocaust (or of factory farming, for that matter), when we 
see their condensation. But the Holocaust is not here denied singularity, just as the 
mother’s face does not get entirely assimilated in the daughter’s face or vice versa. 
When I see-as—when I see something and then see it differently—I am noticing an 
aspect. I am not claiming “this is just like that” —at least not yet. It is only after 
reflective examination that a seeing-as experience can be intentionally used to make 
an analogy that may figure in argument. But if Costello is not making arguments, then 
this is not an analogy, and I am spared my offense, and Costello avoids what could be 
taken as yet another failed and clichéd move whereby the Holocaust is used to 
interpret any issue of moral concern (Fleming 2015).15   
 
Importantly, however, and in contrast to what Diamond claims, it is quite possible to 
verbalize an imagistic seeing-as experience in words. One can describe the feelings 
involved in the experience, spelling out the imaginative associations (for example, 
similarities, inversions) and the respects in which they hold. The words may miss 
their target, if that target is the affective aspect of the experience. But affect can be 
 
15 This is not to suggest that such comparisons could not be objectively valid. But the 
over-use of the Holocaust in moralizing comparisons might make the most valid 
comparison imaginable rhetorically useless. See the satire by Bohemian Browser 
Ballet “Nazikeule im Dritten Reich”, May 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvgZtdmyKlI. And The Jews are Coming, Season 
3, episode 4 ״Don’t say Nazi” November 2017 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCp4eg5w8ZI 
“transferred” to others, to use the Freudian metaphor, through the use of words qua 
marks and noises with a host of associations in their wake. When we use words 
poetically, we evoke associations in other people, associations that may also be 
accompanied with the relevant affect. In that manner, we can use words that would 
cause in others an affective experience that is similar to the one we are going through.  
 
I tried to read the above passage with compassion to Costello, described as an old and 
frail and lonely woman, a woman who has gone through a personal trauma of assault, 
a woman who cannot ignore the harm done to animals she identifies with so strongly. 
I can understand the similarities she sees between the Holocaust and factory farming, 
even if I don’t see the soap made by the Nazis within the soap I see in stores. I know 
my husband eats pork when I am not around, and it feels impossible to me that he 
would eat creatures so similar to dogs that he loves and has a history of 
companionship with (I imagine Singer shares this inversion too regarding certain 
people he loves), but nothing about the Holocaust comes to my mind when I 
experience this inversion. I also share the appreciation of the pervasive human 
capacity for inattention in virtually all aspects of our emotional lives. The passage has 
made me think about the associative components of Costello’s condensation. But 
associations can always go on, so I found myself thinking about each of those 
imageries separately, side by side, feeling the affect each of them evokes in me 
separately. So I ended up feeling something similar to what Costello does, due to her 
poetic expression, even if only partly. 
 
This is why, I take it, Diamond is right to describe Costello as “see[ing] poetry, rather 
than philosophy, as having the capacity to return us to such a sense of what animal 
life is” (2003, 8-9). It is because our imaginatively-evoked affective life comprises 
our animalistic aspect. But philosophy too can engage in this transmission of affect, in 
a more explicit, more descriptive way. Articulation need not be either rational 
argument or poetic engagement. It can also be the insistence to describe one’s 
affective and imaginative experience, to identify and give meaning to the associations 
that caused one’s experience. And this kind of articulation can cause a similar 
experience in those who read it, through association.  Here, too, clarity of exposition, 
a value that is crucial to philosophy, matters to the success of transmission of affect. 
One could spell out the respects in which a similarity association holds in more or less 
detail with more or less success in demonstrating its fruitfulness. One could use more 
or less exact and detailed terms to describe one’s embodied feelings. And one could 
do that without taking recourse to further poetic means of expression. If a poem can 
be said to be “clear” – such clarity would mean something quite different.  
 
Furthermore, philosophy, traditionally engaged in generalization and rational 
argument, also has a tradition of examples. The call for animality can also be seen as 
Wittgenstein’s call to go “[b]ack to the rough ground” (1953, §107), and use more 
examples from our affective lives, including real-life and fictional examples. This is 
how philosophy can do justice to the singularity of experience, while still offering 
something more general, something like a methodology of interpretation.  
 
This, so it seems to me, is precisely what Diamond is doing in her paper, showing us 
in great clarity and detail a phenomenon she calls the difficulty of reality, through the 
examination of examples of difficult realities, exposing the inversions that underlie 
them, describing the feelings they evoke. Although not every reader will feel what 
Diamond and the poets and philosophers she engages with feel—some readers will, 
for her words can evoke the associative imagination and may enliven feelings we are 
all capable of feeling. And these particular feelings have a deep ethical significance 
regarding our relations to other people and animals, and a deep philosophical 
significance regarding the limits of rational argument and the role of the imagination 
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